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Engineering Moral Machines 
Michael Fisher, Christian List, Marija Slavkovik, and Alan Winfield1 
mfisher@liverpool.ac.uk, c.list@lse.ac.uk, marija.slavkovik@uib.no, alan.winfield@uwe.ac.uk 
Abstract 
This article provides a short report on a recent Dagstuhl Seminar on “Engineering Moral 
Agents”. Imbuing robots and autonomous systems with ethical norms and values is an 
increasingly urgent challenge, given rapid developments in, for example, driverless cars, 
unmanned air vehicles (drones), and care assistant robots. Seminar participants discussed two 
immediate problems. A challenge for philosophical research is the formalisation of ethics in a 
format that lends itself to machine implementation; a challenge for computer science and 
robotics is the actual implementation of moral reasoning and conduct in autonomous systems. 
This article reports on these two challenges. 
Introduction 
Machines and software with limited autonomy have existed in our society for many years. To 
guarantee the safety and well-being of their users and others, two strategies have traditionally 
been employed. Either the systems in question are used only in strictly controlled environments, 
as in the case of automated trains and factory robotic arms, or they are designed to have very 
limited abilities to manipulate their environments, as in the case of robotic floor cleaners. 
However, systems with increased autonomy and intentionality, for short “AI systems”, are an 
imminent reality. Prominent examples are driverless vehicles, robotic surgical systems, and 
care assistant robots. There is also increasing automation in civil aviation and in military drones.  
AI systems require sufficient physical capabilities to interact with their environments in the 
intended ways, yet they also often share their operation space with people. This means that 
many of the traditional solutions for ensuring operational safety, legality, and compliance with 
moral norms are no longer applicable. A number of concerns arise once advanced AI systems 
and people share the same environment. These concerns include, but are not limited to: 
• ensuring the safety of the people who share their space with AI systems;  
• developing operational standards and certification methods for such systems;  
• determining who is legally responsible for their operation, and ensuring compliance 
with legal and moral norms;  
• defining the scope of responsibility for any harms caused; 
• designing the systems to recognise, and correctly to respond to, moral decision problems 
in time-critical situations; and  
• preventing abuse of these systems by people for illegal or immoral purposes.  
Many countries are beginning to develop legal frameworks and industrial standards for open-
market availability and widespread use of certain AI systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles 
                                                
1 The authors are very grateful to all the participants of the Dagstuhl Seminar on “Engineering 
Moral Agents” for their contributions to the discussion and to John Horty, Marcus Pivato, and 
Kai Spiekermann for helpful comments on a draft of this article. 
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and driverless cars. As is commonly recognised, the problems involved are not just engineering 
problems, but conceptual and philosophical ones.  
Moral philosophy goes back to antiquity, long pre-dating even the fictional consideration of AI 
systems. For this reason, the vast body of thought in moral philosophy is premised on the idea 
that moral agents are human. Relatively little consideration has been given to the possibility 
that systems other than individual human beings might qualify as moral agents (exceptions can 
be found in discussions of group agency, e.g., in French 1984 and List and Pettit 2011). AI 
systems differ fundamentally from humans. Their hardware and software are very different 
from human biology and psychology, and human beings have many characteristics that AI 
systems typically lack: for example, they are conscious, mortal, emotional, dependent on 
society, born and raised by other people, and trained and motivated by their peers. Therefore 
traditional lessons from moral philosophy may not be directly transferable to artificial agents.  
Moral issues arise, not only when AI systems directly influence and affect people’s lives, but 
also when they aid human decision-making or indirectly facilitate human activities. The 
relevant area of research has become known as “machine ethics” or “artificial morality”. It 
draws on many disciplines, such as robotics, computer science, philosophy, psychology, law, 
and economics.  
The Dagstuhl Seminar 16222 on “Engineering Moral Agents”, held in May 2016, brought 
together researchers from several disciplines to review the current state of the field and to 
identify key challenges for future research. Much of the discussion revolved around questions 
concerning how to develop a moral framework for “intelligent” machines. How can we 
implement moral reasoning in AI systems? How might we build regulatory structures that 
address (un)ethical machine behaviour? What are the wider societal, legal, and economic 
implications of introducing AI systems into our society?   
The seminar participants compared two leading approaches to engineering moral machines, the 
so-called “constraint-based” and “training approaches”, and discussed two immediate 
challenges. A challenge for philosophical research is the formalisation of ethics in a format that 
subsequently lends itself to machine implementation; a challenge for computer science and 
robotics is the actual implementation of moral reasoning and conduct in autonomous systems. 
In this article, we briefly report on the discussion. 
Two approaches to engineering moral machines 
It is generally recognised that there are two core approaches to engineering moral machines 
(Allen et al. 2005): 
• a constraint-based approach: explicitly constraining the actions of an AI system in 
accordance with moral norms; and 
• a training approach: training the AI system to recognise and correctly respond to morally 
challenging situations. 
These are sometimes also called “top-down” and “bottom-up”. In addition, there are also hybrid 
approaches. Let us briefly discuss these approaches in turn.  
The constraint-based approach involves identifying a set of rules or principles that an AI system 
has to follow and then implementing them, so as to pre-check or constrain the system’s actions. 
Isaac Asimov’s famous laws of robotics are an example of such rules. Asimov’s laws require 
that, first, robotic systems must not harm humans or allow them to be harmed; second, they 
must obey human orders provided this does not conflict with the first law; and third, they must 
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protect themselves provided this does not conflict with the first two laws. In reality, of course, 
these laws are just a very simple, illustrative starting point, and more complex and nuanced sets 
of norms are needed for genuine action guidance. What if a machine is faced with a choice 
between avoiding a grave harm to one person and avoiding a lesser harm to several people, for 
example? 
In principle, some moral theories, such as utilitarianism and Kantian deontology, may be 
amenable for devising constraints on action, provided those theories can be suitably formalised 
(cf. Allen 2005). Utilitarian theories, in particular, have been formalized in disciplines such as 
decision theory and social choice theory (e.g., Broome 1991). Arguably, however, common-
sense morality is not utilitarian, but involves deontological principles and various heuristics. 
Furthermore, moral rules and principles are often vague and context-dependent, and there can 
be conflicts between them. Both formalisation and conflict resolution remain significant 
challenges, even within moral philosophy. It is fair to say that we currently have no complete 
formalization of common-sense morality. 
A training approach involves applying techniques such as machine learning to “educate” an AI 
system to recognise morally challenging situations and to resolve conflicts, much as human 
beings are educated by their carers and community to become moral agents. Until recently, 
limitations in computational power have restricted the scope of such an approach, but advances 
in computing, especially in processing large data sets, make it increasingly feasible. A training 
approach avoids some of the problems of a constraint-based approach. In particular, we do not 
require a completely formalized moral theory for it. A sufficiently rich training database of 
illustrative moral decision problems, with the appropriate target judgments, is sufficient for the 
approach to get off the ground. The machine’s acquisition of morality would be much like the 
way in which a Bayesian learning system can be trained to recognize cancer cells or other salient 
patterns in medical images.  
But the approach comes at a cost, since training is slow, resource-intensive, error-prone, and 
may – in the extreme case – have to be done anew for each different AI system. Moreover, we 
would require a compelling database of examples of what it means to behave ethically or 
unethically, and there is much disagreement on what the correct moral judgments would be, 
even among moral philosophers. Finally, an AI system that learns its morality through big data 
may not be able to explain why the actions it chooses are moral. The ability to explain one’s 
actions is often considered a crucial feature of moral agency.  
Much work in machine ethics, up to now, has been exploratory, describing and debating the 
feasibility of artificial morality, its implementation, and the relevant social impact. Some 
constraint-based and training systems have been developed, typically to serve as a proof of 
concept. An example of a training approach is discussed in Anderson and Anderson (2014), 
while examples of constraint-based approaches are discussed in Arkin et al. (2012), Winfield 
et al. (2014), and Dennis et al. (2016).  
A clear advantage of a constraint-based approach – especially if it involves the symbolic 
representation of moral reasoning – is the possibility (at least in principle) of using formal 
verification to test that the reasoning works as intended. If a training approach is used, on the 
other hand, the training should ideally take place before the autonomous system is deployed in 
practice, and the system’s moral behaviour should be somehow tested. A possible path to 
certifying trained systems is considered in Anderson et al. (2016). However, regulatory bodies 
and other public institutions have yet to determine what exactly characterises an autonomous 
system that is “safe to deploy”.  
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Against this background, the seminar participants at Dagstuhl split into two discussion groups. 
The first considered the formalisation of moral reasoning, the second its implementation.  
Formalising moral reasoning  
To illustrate what sorts of questions moral reasoning must generally address, consider two 
stylized examples of moral decision problems. The first comes from Scanlon (1998, p. 235):  
“Jones has suffered an accident in the transmitter room of a television station. Electrical 
equipment has fallen on his arm, and we cannot rescue him without turning off the 
transmitter for fifteen minutes. A World Cup match is in progress, watched by many 
people, and it will not be over for an hour. Jones’s injury will not get any worse if we 
wait, but his hand has been mashed and he is receiving extremely painful electrical 
shocks. Should we rescue him now or wait until the match is over? Does the right thing 
to do depend on how many people are watching... ?” 
The second example is the well-known trolley problem, introduced by Foot (1967), which we 
here summarise as follows: 
A run-away trolley races down a track. At the end of the track, there are five people, 
who will be run over by the trolley and killed if the trolley is not diverted to a side-track. 
At the end of the side-track, however, there is one person, who will be run over and 
killed if the trolley is diverted. You are in control of a switch to determine whether or 
not to divert the trolley onto the side-track. Should you divert the trolley?  
In each of these cases, we – human beings – have certain moral intuitions as to what the right 
action is. Sometimes we have conflicting intuitions, and different moral principles yield 
different verdicts. Moral theories are an attempt to systematise our moral intuitions, in order to 
deduce them from some underlying principles and to explain them. The challenge for machine 
ethics is to encode moral theories in a machine-implementable way. This often requires 
formalization, at least if we opt for a constraint-based approach to engineering moral machines.  
The discussion group considered several approaches to the formalization of moral theories. The 
first set of approaches uses logic, such as deontic logic or default logic, to represent moral 
reasoning explicitly. Candidate formalisms can be found in classical deontic logic, but also in 
the recent work of several of our seminar participants. John Horty, for instance, uses a version 
of default logic to represent legal and moral reasoning (Horty 2012). Marek Sergot applies 
variants of deontic logic and STIT (“see to it that”) logic to represent normative relations 
between agents (e.g., Sergot 2013). Both Horty and Sergot presented some of their ideas to the 
group. Horty talked about developing a computational theory of moral reasoning based on his 
representation of moral rules in default logic, and Sergot talked about value-based 
argumentation and prioritised defeasible conditional imperatives.  
A logical formalization of a moral theory is symbolic and thereby lends itself, in principle, to 
verification and validation: formally proving that a moral system has the intended properties. 
Moreover, many of the leading logical formalisms can accommodate several competing moral 
theories, so that the formalisms do not by themselves dictate the resulting moral judgments. In 
particular, unlike some classical decision-theoretic approaches, they are not automatically 
committed to some version of consequentialism, but can capture deontological theories too. 
Insofar as common-sense morality is arguably not consequentialist, this approach clearly holds 
some promise.  
A second set of approaches comes from decision theory. Here, the idea is to apply insights from 
microeconomics to the formalisation of moral theories. Formalizations of utilitarianism and 
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other consequentialist theories, for instance, explicitly introduce utility or welfare functions for 
all affected subjects of moral concern – for instance, all people that might be affected by a 
decision – and then represent moral reasoning as an optimization problem: the goal may be, for 
instance, to maximize expected total utility. One of our participants, Marcus Pivato, gave an 
overview of such formalizations. 
More generally, we may ask whether even those moral theories that are not overtly 
consequentialist can be translated into a consequentialist format. A moral theory is said to be 
“consequentializable” if its action-guiding recommendations can be represented by a choice 
function that is induced by some linear ordering (a “betterness ordering”) over all actions under 
consideration (e.g., Brown 2011). There is considerable debate in moral philosophy about 
whether all moral theories can be consequentialized, at least in principle. The discussion group 
concluded – in agreement with a number of philosophers – that consequentialization has its 
formal limits. We can consequentialize some conventionally non-consequentialist theories only 
at the cost of stretching or redefining the notion of “consequence” (for discussions, see, e.g., 
Brown 2011, Dietrich and List 2016). If we are willing to build various contextual features into 
the notion of “consequence”, then “consequentialization” becomes vacuously possible, but it 
will no longer be very useful for the purpose of encoding moral theories in a machine-
implementable way. 
A third approach was presented by Christian List, based on joint work with Franz Dietrich. This 
approach is an attempt to represent a large class of moral theories in a canonical format, without 
“consequentializing” them in a potentially trivialising manner. Specifically, Dietrich and List 
(2016) offer a “reason-based” formalisation of moral theories. They encode the action-guiding 
content of a moral theory in terms of a choice function (here they share the starting point of the 
standard decision-theoretic approach), which they interpret as a “rightness” function. Formally, 
this is a function that assigns to each set of feasible actions or options the subset of morally 
permissible ones. Instead of consequentializing this rightness function, they show that any 
rightness function within a large class can be represented in terms of two parameters: (i) a 
specification of which properties of the options are normatively relevant in any given context, 
and (ii) a betterness relation over sets of properties. Importantly, the normatively relevant 
properties need not be restricted to “consequence properties” alone, but can also include 
“relational properties”, i.e., properties specifying how options relate to the context of choice. A 
relational property might be, for instance, whether a given option satisfies some context-specific 
moral norm.  
Reason-based representations provide a taxonomy of moral theories, as theories can be 
classified in terms of parameters (i) and (ii) above. We may ask: are the same properties 
normatively relevant in all contexts? If so, the theory is universalistic; if not, the theory is 
relativistic. Further, are the normatively relevant properties restricted to “consequence 
properties”? If so, the theory is consequentialist; if not, it is non-consequentialist. 
The discussion group recognised that the same action-guiding recommendations can often be 
systematised by competing moral theories (as argued, e.g., by Broome 2004, ch. 3, and Dietrich 
and List 2016). This is a consequence of the fact that moral theories specify not only how we 
ought to act, but also why we ought to act in that way. Different answers to the “why” question 
may be compatible with the same answer to the “how” question. An interesting issue, therefore, 
is whether moral machines need to get only the “how” question right, or whether the “why” 
question matters for them as well.  
The discussion group further acknowledged the need to take resource-boundedness into account 
when we formalise moral theories. Joseph Halpern, in particular, explained this aspect (see also 
Halpern et al. 2014). If our goal is to arrive at machine-implementable moral theories, we cannot 
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presuppose complete information and unlimited computational capacities. While the idea of 
bounded rationality has received much attention in psychology and economics, there is no 
equally well-developed analogue of this idea for morality: a notion of “resource-bounded 
morality”. There is some work on “ideal versus non-ideal theory” in moral philosophy, but this 
is primarily concerned with the morality of institutions and institutional design, and less with 
individual agents whose agentive capacities are limited. One interesting question is whether, 
under informational and computational constraints, rule-based, deontological, or virtue-ethical 
approaches might outperform consequentialist approaches, for which optimization is central 
(cf. Slote 1989). That said, we can also define versions of utilitarianism that are based on the 
idea of constrained optimisation. Similarly, some versions of rule utilitarianism (or more 
generally, rule consequentialism) are attempts to reconcile consequentialist moral philosophy 
with computational and informational constraints.   
Finally, the discussion group noted that, at present, moral reasoning focuses – rightly – on 
human beings and other sentient animals (perhaps also the environment) as the ultimate units 
of moral concern. This raises the question of whether, and to what extent, the (still hypothetical) 
development of AI consciousness might require a more significant rethinking of our 
anthropocentric moral codes.   
Implementing moral reasoning  
The key challenge for computer scientists, roboticists, and engineers is not so much the question 
of which moral theory to implement, but rather the actual implementation of moral reasoning 
in AI systems. There are advantages and disadvantages of both standard approaches to 
implementing moral reasoning: top-down and bottom-up. In a top-down approach, one begins 
with a well-defined task or objective that is to be solved by the system. The system is then 
designed to fulfil these requirements in the given environment or on the given data. In a bottom-
up approach, the environment or data is the starting point. The system then uses some form of 
automated learning in order to detect patterns in that environment or data and to perform the 
desired task on the basis of the detected patterns. This approach typically requires large amounts 
of data as input: a training database. A hybrid approach is also possible, but it is less clear what 
its advantages and disadvantages would be. 
The discussion group considered issues of specification and verification with respect to both 
approaches, which in turn raised issues of transparency and accountability. The problem of 
(formal) verification is to prove that an autonomous system’s actions are within the bounds of 
moral behaviour for the context in which it operates. The issue of transparency, as with much 
other complex machinery, is the issue of the level of detail of operation that will be made 
accessible to different concerned entities such as the end user, the manufacturer, licensed 
maintenance personnel, government regulatory bodies, and so on. 
When a machine is in a position to cause harm to, or even death of, numerous people, such as 
the autopilot of a passenger airplane, certain safety standards are required. An autopilot is 
considered safe if it operates without causing an accident in a certain “very high” number of 
cases. It seems evident that such safety requirements will need to be specified for AI systems 
capable of making decision in situations where moral considerations are relevant. The question 
of how safe is “safe enough” needs to be further discussed in this context. Taking passenger 
aircraft as an exemplar, the discussion group agreed on the need for some classes of AI systems 
– driverless cars for instance – to be equipped with “ethical black boxes”: devices that will 
allow the internal moral decision-making processes to be recorded for later review during, for 
example, accident investigations. 
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The group discussed possible effects that a moral reasoning machine can have on society. By 
implementing one moral code rather than another, the manufacturer of a device may be 
implicitly imposing one culture’s morality on another culture, which might have different 
values than the manufacturer’s. In addition, introducing machines capable of moral reasoning 
into a society may have unpredictable effects on that society and on how people behave towards 
such machines. The behaviour of the machines may not cause any physical harm, but it may set 
in motion events that inevitably lead to unintended social or psychological harms. These risks 
must be taken into consideration when AI systems are designed and deployed.  
The group also recognized the importance of protecting the operation of AI systems from 
malicious or mischievous influence by users and society, which the group termed “the dark 
side” of moral machines. Each of the approaches to implementing moral reasoning is 
susceptible to different kinds of vulnerabilities, which must be taken into account.  
In the final closing discussion, Kai Spiekermann made an important methodological remark 
about the implementation of moral reasoning in AI systems, related to the earlier discussion of 
the formalization of moral theories. He noted that it is sometimes assumed that the 
implementation of moral reasoning in machines is possible only once we have found a way of 
completely formalizing common-sense morality. But it may well be that no such formalization 
can ever be achieved. As Spiekermann pointed out, we also do not expect human moral agents 
to have a completely specified (let alone formalized) moral code at their disposal. To the 
contrary, while human moral agents have clear intuitions about, and agree on, clear-cut cases, 
such as the importance of avoiding unnecessary suffering, they often lack settled judgments 
about more complicated cases and passionately argue about them. Examples of such cases are 
the trade-offs between different values or the resolution of moral dilemmas. It appears that 
having a complete moral code is not what we normally require for moral agency, and, by 
extension, it may be implausible to require machines to have a complete moral code. The 
properties that appear to make someone (or something) a moral agent are the following: they 
include the ability to reason and to justify moral choices, and perhaps they also include certain 
complex psychological abilities, such as the ability to empathize. A promising avenue for 
engineering artificial moral agents may be to work towards building systems that have these 
abilities, rather than requiring the implementation of a completely specified moral code. 
Concluding remarks 
The moral behaviour of machines is a topic of growing urgency, particularly with the prospect 
of increasingly advanced AI systems being introduced into our societies in the coming years. It 
is essential to ensure, first, that the reasoning implemented in those machines is designed by 
experts across robotics, computer science, philosophy, psychology, law, and economics who 
have a sufficiently deep understanding of the relevant issues, and second, that it is scrutinized 
by a well-informed public debate. The design of moral machines must not be left exclusively 
to companies and manufactures without critical expert input or a transparent process of public 
scrutiny. Efforts such as this seminar, endeavouring to discuss and clarify the challenges of 
machine ethics, are vital to ensuring not only that AI systems are reliable, but also that the 
public will trust them enough to rely on them. This is an ongoing process, and the relevant 
discussions, across all disciplines and across all strands of society, must continue.  
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